Controlling History: The Political Use of the Past to Create a Modern Turkish Identity 分享原创

I learned one truth in my travels. This state has two spiritual foundations. The call to prayer that Mehmed the Conqueror had sung from the minarets of Hagia Sophia? It is still sung! The Qur'an thatSelim had read in the Pavilion of the Mantle of the Prophet? It is still read!

Selective remembrance of the past was vital for the newly established Turkish republic. As a newly established state, the Turkish government needed to create an identity juxtaposed to the established identities that were rampant during the Ottoman Era, with the Ottoman-Islamic identity being the most prominent. However, the new state was established on the principles of nationalism, rationalism, and secularism. Thus, the Turkish government could not utilize the previously widespread Islamic identity, nor can it embody the identity of its former ruler, the Ottoman. Therefore, the state began to invest its efforts in establishing a nationalistic Turkish identity that was fundamentally devoid of both Ottoman and Islamic influence and necessity. This project largely began in the 1930’s, almost a decade after the establishment of the Republic. It encompassed the name of different facets including a shift to the Latin alphabet re-education. For the purpose of this paper, the Turkish National Thesis was by far the most influential. In an effort to rewrite history, the Turkish government financed a “new” view which proposed that the Turkish people had a long history before the advent of Islam and the Ottoman empire, which in turn produced a great Turkish civilization that lefts its mark upon most civilization afterwards. This new historiographical world-view that re-enforced the proposed nationalistic Turkish identity was instilled in altering the landscape of Istanbul, the previous Ottoman capital. The Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi were two key monuments that captured the essence of Ottoman-Islamic rule and thus. The Turkish government needed to either destroy these monuments or reinvent them to fit into their newly proposed identity. The latter was chosen, and through altering and selectively remembering the past, were able to secularize and transform them into museums that highlighted the triumphs of the new republic at the expense of the old Ottoman regime.

Historicizing the period

The time period that this paper will focus on cover spans from the beginning of the Republic in the 1920’s to the 1930’s. This block of time depicts the struggle that the Kemalist government faced as they attempted to consolidate power and rework the new Turkish State under the heavy hand and vision of its leader, Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” (1881-1938). Soner Cagaptay has characterized 1920s and the 1930’s, into two distinct time periods each with their own specific and unique characteristics. For Cagaptay, the 1920’s was an era wherein Turkey was recovering from the devastation, both material and demographic, brought on by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the First World War, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1920-22. Thus, Cagaptay characterizes this period as “a period of physical and political re-structuring when Ataturk had focused his energy on establishing a secular republic”.

The clearest example of the political re-structuring was the struggle between the nationalists (the Ankara Circle) and the Istanbul Circle, the latter, defined by Ozoglu as those who did not support the Ankara movement, in particular, the royalists. This struggle is highlighted with the “Incident of 150ers” (Yuzellilikler Olayi) wherein the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) included a causes that stipulated that while there was to be a general amnesty towards those who were cooperating with the enemy (against the new Turkish Republic), the Turks had a right to name 150 people of Muslim origin that would be excluded from the general amnesty. This comprehensive lists provides a good indicator of the people and factions that made the Ankara Circle nervous and they included: Vahdettin’s circle who were not members of the dynasty, Ottoman Cabinet members who assumed responsibility for the anti-Ankara caliphal army, those who signed the Treaty of Sevres, members of the Caliphal Army, Ethem “the Circassian” and his associates, Delegates in the Circassian Congress, police officer who cooperated with the occupying forces, and journalists who were in opposition to the Ankara Circle. Thus, what is interesting about this list is the decision to exclude the Kurds, even though the Kemalists were aware of Kurdish nationalism and their potential threat (which was shown in the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion). However, rather than expelling Kurdish leaders, the Ankara Circle decided to include a large Circassian group, a number of which were inconsequential Circassian nationalists. Ozoglu argues that this is because the Circassians were traditionally close to the Ottoman rule and royalty and therefore, the Ankara Circle was worried that they would ally themselves with the foreign powers. Therefore, this period can be defined as a period of political re-structuring especially to uproot the previous Ottoman dynasty, as Ataturk believed that “as long as the Ottoman dynasty resided in Turkey, the opponents of Ankara would be encouraged.” The beginning of the1930’s marked a break from 1920’s in terms of its priorities and focuses. In the 1930’s, the Republic was more firmly established and the country had ben rebuilt and thus, the state was able to shift from the previous priority of consolidating its rule and stamping out the supporters of the previous Ottoman dynasty to ideology and state building. The ideologies that the state would focus on were outlined in a speech given by Ataturk on September 24, 1931 where he declared that the main principles of Kemalism was republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism.

However, it is important to note that this teleological periodization of time as distinct periods, each with its unique characteristics, has its faults and is utilized in an effort to show the shifts within government policy in a way that is more approachable and simplistic. The government did indeed feel more confident in the 1930’s than in the previous era and therefore was able to move ahead with its nationalistic plans; however, to say it began in 1930 would oversimplify reality. Furthermore, even in the 1930’s, government policy was in no way clear-cut and there were still debates on a number of different issues. One example would be on the membership of ethnic minorities in the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Although by law, CHP membership was to be open only to ethnic Turks and closed to non-Turks, on May 5, 1933, there was still confusion on this issue and is exemplified by the need for a memorandum addressing this. This shows that the local branches of the CHP still were trying to decide whether or not the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews were Turks and thereby displaying a lack of cohesion and confusion between theory and practice. This is also true with secularism and the idea that after the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and the subsequent shifts in other religious policies in the 1920s did not create a secular state in the 1930’s. The state had become more secular but there was a gap between theory and practice and therefore caution is necessary when using terms such as, “by the beginning of the 1930’s, when a secular republic (My italics) had been firmly established….”

The policies and goals of the aforementioned eras align with the decision for the museumifcation of the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi. The attempt to uproot and supplant the old Ottoman dynasty and its representations in the 1920’s would be a reason for the secularization and repossession of both the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi, two Ottoman monuments that dominated the skyline of Istanbul. Furthermore, it was during the 1930’s wherein the Kemalists were able to begin to write a nationalist discourse, ie the Turkish National Thesis, that would influence and direct the secularization of the aforementioned monuments and Turkish architectural style.

Turkish National Thesis

Turkey was one of the few non-European states that never succumbed to colonial suzerainty and therefore, the construction of a collective Turkish identity was facilitated by the resistance against colonialism. Rather than attempting to write an original, source based history, the authors of this “new” Turkish history used already established “facts” that were utilized by the West in their narratives, to produced their own Turkish history that would supplant and expose the falsities of the teleological narcissistic history of the West and show how the “facts” used by them actually showed the greatness of the Turkic people. These “facts” were grounded in the sciences, such as geology, archaeology, and linguists and thus were seen as “neutral” and therefore, if correctly used, could be recycled to create a new master history for the Turkish people. Thus, the Turkish National Thesis attempted to uncover and rediscover the “genius and character of Turks, showing Turks their own specialties and strength” and showing the civilizational capabilities of the Turks. It argued that the Turks had always been civilized and that the ancient Turks, who had civilized Central Asia, had brought the light of civilization to places such as China, India, Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley, Anatolia, and the Aegean. The Turks migrated places where they claim that the “true natives had no civilization”. Thus, the notion that the Turkish people are the truth light of the world and that they bring civilization with them, and a counter to the Hegalian conception of history which argued, how like the sun moves from East to West, so does civilization, which moved from China, to India, to the Middle East until finally resting on Europe. Rather, the Turks were the true founders of Western civilization for they brought the light of civilization to the Sumar, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans and that this can be proven through linguistics and thus, rationale science. The languages of the Sumerians, Etruscans, and Hittite, all of which were potentially proto-Indo-European languages, fall under the linguistic category of Turkish. This attempt to draw a connection linguistically to the early and Western civilizations also appears in the racial claims, also based on scientific reason, that the Turks were in fact a white and brachycephalic race. Rather than to be placed in the category of yellow races, which were considered by Europeans as secondary people, the Turkish National Thesis argued that even though they originated from Central Asia, the Turks were, in reality, belonging to the White race.

The Turkish National Thesis was the project of the Turkish Historical Commission, which was established on April 23, 1930 and in that year published A General outline of Turkish History, which was written under the guidance of Ataturk himself. The following year (1931), a four-volume set of high school history textbooks was published and between the years of 1933-1936, sixty-six follow up projects were produced. The purpose of the Turkish National Thesis was (1) to secularize Turkish history and also the historical worldview through science and reason; (2) to remove the Eurocentric perception of world history and thus, turning the focus of history eastwards rather than westwards; (3) to expose the archaism of the Ottoman past as backwards and irrational with its use of religion; (4) to show that Turkish history had a glorious past prior to the rise of the Ottomans and Islam. Therefore, the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi, both of which were beacons of the Ottoman past, were to be supplanted and this was done in conjuncture to the Historical National Thesis. The Ottoman monuments were a symbol of the archaistic Ottoman rule and with the rise of the Historical National Thesis, the need to hark back to the Ottoman past was no longer necessary, rather, the State could first downplay and discredit the Ottoman past, and through new architectural forms, accentuate the glories of the Turkic past, thereby strengthening the new states claim to the Anatolian heartland through a new nationalists identity.

Methodology and theories

Foucault asserts that knowledge and power and intertwined with one another and that the more complex power structures become, the knowledge that they produce allows for the existence of Modernity. Therefore, as power increase, it allows for the creation of specific knowledge and vice-versa. Furthermore, the concept of governmentality also plays a role in knowledge production and thus, shape identity and knowledge. The knowledge that is produced by government institutions (Universities, organizations, NGO’s) all shape the way that we view the world and through organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) enable the governance of a people. This paper will use the theories of Foucault as mentioned above, which in turn shaped theories in Archeology in an attempt to provide new insight into the way in which the creation of museums shape identity and nationalism. Archeology, like museums, is a discipline that is highly susceptible to political influences and pressures for the needs of the state and thus uses the “past” in order to justify their authority and rule. States need to create and ensure that its citizens possess a “consciousness of togetherness” and this is especially true for states that have a multi-ethnic characteristic or they risk a social and cultural disintegration. Therefore a shared language and/or shared past and future allow for the impression or feeling of unity, belongingness, and culture which can be created through history or archeology, and in this case, museums. Thus is created a paradigm of an “us” who have a shared present and future and those who are do not, the “other”. This shared present and future also requires a shared past which creates a shared memory, yet the past, in which ever form it is manifested in, such as archeological sites, or museums, need to be contextualized and interpreted and even though archeology is indeed a scientific discipline, the past is shaped by the manipulation and interests of agents who want to create pasts that fit the interests of the present. There political manipulation is fundamentally inherent in archeology because tangible pasts have no voice of their own and because “material objects can move easily from the physical to the symbolical realm.” The voice that is created for these material objects might not have been anticipated by the original makers or the archeologist yet is placed on the object in an effort to politicalize it. The object may seem to be stable and supported but is in fact dynamic and is constantly molded by the pressures exerted externally by social discourse. In Turkey, during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish republic, archeological practices and the founding of museums were seen as a “barometer of the successful Westernization projects” and therefore, are shaped by social discourse.

Another theory that is applicable to this paper is the application of Edward Said’s concept of the “other”. This other was necessary within Turkish Modernity in order to show the progress of the Republic in contrast to showing the irrationality, weakness, and barbarity of the Ottoman Empire or “the other”. In other words, the “other” was everything that was wrong and that it was the obstacle towards modernity and the country. It was what allowed the Turkish people to fall behind. These theories can explain the motives behind the Republic’s decision to secularize both the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi and their subsequent museumification.

Hagia Sophia

The Hagia Sophia, also known as the Aya Sophia, was the central mosque of the Ottoman sultan since its capture in 1453 until 1932 when it was made into a museum. The Hagia Sophia was the first Imperial Mosque of the Ottoman Empire and was attended by the Sultan on the Jumu'ah. The questions that need to be asked are: How was it possible to secularize and musuemify a Muslim monument? Why was the Hagia Sophia chosen? What was the motive behind it? And what was the process and methods employed to secularize and museumification the Hagia Sophia?

As shown in the previous section, by the 1930’s, the State was much more firmly in power and the Turkish opponents to the state had been largely repressed. Furthermore, in the 1930’s, the government had begun a campaign to construct a new Turkish nationalistic discourse in order to supplant the previous multi-ethnic, ottoman, Islamic identity. Therefore, it was in the 1930’s that Ataturk felt he could transform the Hagia Sophia from a monument of the Islamic Ottoman Empire into a secular Museum and use it to strengthen his own nationalistic discourse and construction. This is concurrent with the argument that Ankara also did not feel confident enough to abolish both the Sultanate and the Caliphate with the same stroke. The abolishment of the Caliphate has been seen by some scholars as not necessarily a move to abolish the office of the Caliphate but to remove the dynasty and its threat. Yet, Ataturk was cautious then and similarly, was cautious and waited for a motive to secularize and museumification the Hagia Sophia.

The decision to make the Hagia Sophia into a museum rather than a number of other Ottoman mosques is based on its previous history prior to the Ottomans. With the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Sultan himself decided to transform the symbol of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, and Imperial Byzantine rule, into a mosque and thereby using this monument to strengthen the Sultan’s rule, legitimacy, and power. However, for Ataturk and the new state, this once Christian Church turned Imperial Mosque became a symbol of the past sultanate and as a monument that dominated the skyline, would remind the citizens of Istanbul of the glories and might of the recently disposed Ottoman sultanate and caliphate. Thus, in order to thwart its potential dangers, Ataturk re-appropriated the Hagia Sophia and by transforming it into a museum, would expose its Christian elements, along side its Islamic additions through secularization, and commodification. This falls inline with the theories put forth by archeologists that changing previous interpretations of existing material evidence, such as any Ottoman Mosque’s, is difficult because they are anchored in the material and thereby participants “can point to material evidence to support his or her claims”. However, by exposing its Christian past, the state weakens the Ottomans identity on the monument and the “consciousness of togetherness” that the Ottomans had created and thereby re-appropriating the past.

The re-appropriation of its past was not only to allow for it secularization and commodification but also to strengthen the paradigm put forth by the Turkish Historical Thesis. As mentioned before, one of the goals of the Turkish Historical Thesis was to create a history for the Turks prior to and that excluded the Ottomans. The Ottomans were the “other” like the Orient was the “other” for the Occident. Turkish modernity was pegged on viewing and portraying the Ottomans as something negative and backwards and therefore, the nationalistic Turkish state needed to rewrite history and create a proud and glories Turkish past that superseded the Ottomans. By weakening the Ottomans hold on such a dominating and powerful monument would strengthen the goals of the Turkish Historical Thesis. Furthermore, the move to secularize and transform the Hagia Sophia into a museum would also eliminate its Islamic identity, an identity that the new state wanted to supplant with a secular Turkish nationalistic identity, all the while increasing its tourism value by catering it towards a Christian audience who could visit it in either or both a religious or secular attitude. The Hagia Sophia would have its solely Ottoman past surplanted and the new state would rediscover the Christian elements that were hidden within the Imperial Mosque. By secularizing the museum and allowing archeologists to uncover the hidden past, for the old Christian mosaics had been plastered over by the Ottomans, the State was staying true to its dogma by modernizing in the sense that it was utilizing science, for archeology was a western scientific discipline, to uncover the Hagia Sophia’s hidden past.

Thomas Whittemore (1871-1950), who was the founder of the Byzantine Institute of America, began uncovering the mosaics in the Hagia Sophia in 1931 and due to his successes, continued well after the Hagia Sophia was opened as a museum in 1935. His uncovering of the mosaics was seen as discovering of a masterpiece for the mosaics of the Hagia Sophia was seen, by its Western Audience, as comparable to the Elgin marbles in the British Museum, for the mosaics in question were a masterpiece of Byzantine art. However, prior to the efforts of Whittemore, the mosaics were only a concept through the descriptions of medieval works rather than a reality. His efforts, and those of his wealthy patrons, were only one manifestation of Western interests in the Hagia Sophia as an expression of Byzantine creativity, art work, and monument. And thus, the decision by the state to allow Whittemore to peel off the plaster that covered the only example of mosaic artwork during the period of Justinian, and the subsequent secularization and establishing the Hagia Sophia as a museum was partly fueled by Western enthusiasm and interest. However, the Hagia Sophia, as a public monument, was affected by its commercialization through the “occupation” of itself as it served not only politics as well as tourism and imagination. Nelson demonstrates that as more Europeans and Americans tourists visited the Hagia Sophia, its immediate surroundings began to transform to make the site look more like the one Western pictures had prepared visitors to see. The Hagia Sophia was transformed from a “living building,” that as both a church and a mosque was “vital and socially significant” to a “modern monument,” that was “frozen in some past age, vaguely Byzantine”.

The Hagia Sophia that was once the center of the Byzantine Empire was transformed, outside the realm that its creator envisioned it, into an imperial mosque, as a symbol of Ottoman power and virility, and was once again repurposed into a museum to serve the discourse of the new Turkish Republic. As the new republic began to stabilize and commenced its efforts to write a new nationalistic discourses in an effort to create a unified Turkish identity, the Hagia Sophia, a monument of the past grander, was utilized as both an exponent of a new future (one that is secular, based on reason and science) and to expose and rewrite its ottoman past. As a voiceless monument, the Turkish state was able to empower it as a symbol of a new beginning. As a secular museum, no longer did religion have a hold on the Hagia Sophia other than in history, for it became frozen in time. Therefore it became malleable to serve the Turkish Historical Thesis as a remembrance of the former might of the Ottoman Empire but only as a museum, a monument of the old, that would eventually be shaped and warped by the outside pressures of commercialization and the West.

Topkapi Sarayi

The Topkapi Sarayi was the primary residence of the Ottoman sultans for approximately 400 years (1465–1856) of their 624-year reign and in 1924, it lawfully went from a monument that represented the Empire to one that represented the Nation. It was only until 1927 that it was open to the public but mostly the palace remained closed until after renovations undertaken between 1939 and 1942. Unlike the Hagia Sophia, which was still used as a mosque for believers, the palace was in disuse, with only elderly serving staff, the surviving eunuchs, and dwarves as its remaining residents. The fact that it was largely abandoned was one of the main reasons that the state felt confident enough to reclaim and transform the palace into a museum soon after the disbanding of the Caliphate. The process of preparing the palace for museumhood provides insight into the goals the new Republic had for the museum because it had to be contextualized and interpreted.

Sedad Hakki Eldem (1908-88), one of the Republic's architects, described the palace as “a place full of valuable treasures piled on top of one another, fabrics sometimes in rags and sometimes echoing their former resplendence” and that “most of these places that I mention have been cleaned, that is destroyed, and the essential cut-stone foundations and arches brought out”. Eldem was told, in 1937, to take photos, especially the crumbling parts of the palace, for a glimpse of the palace “before” the restorations. This act of taking “before” photos is highly significant within the discourses that the State was propagating for it has two implication: (a) it strengthened this idea of the Ottomans as the “other”, and (b) it showed the strength of the new state and how it was them that restored such an important Turkish monument back to its former splendor and redeeming it from being “stuck on during the period of decline." Both points strengthen the notion of the new Turkish nationalist identity, and how the new state has once again brought glory and power back to the Turkish people.

The Topkapi Sarayi also fell victim to selective remembrance; for as stated above, the elimination of the previous past and its association with politics is a part of constructing a useable past. For the Topkapi Sarayi, only certain elements were utilized in order to show a specific past by freezing it in time and thereby creating a relatively anachronistic and static view of the palace. The Tiled Pavilion was one section that received this treatment. It was constructed during the reign of Mehmed II, which utilized an International Timurid style that incorporated Central Asian influenced bricks, Persian façade and tiles, and a Revivalist Gothic elements. The uses of this style were to convey the Universalist quality of Mehmed II’s world empire. However, the museum totally leaves out this narrative and visual history by having the building used as a separate museum of ceramics. Furthermore, many of the later, most humble rooms are closed off, the Treasury Pavilion was not restored to its former past but rather its walls were left whitewashed, and in some parts of the palace, the decorations had simply been stripped such as the case of the kitchen. The meaning behind these decisions are undocumented but work together to portray the Topkapi Sarayi as a monument that once been the site of aristocratic opulence at the expense of the commoners (due to the plainness of the kitchen), and hid the universalist motifs that were utilized by Mehmed II that went counter to the nationalistic Turkish rhetoric’s of the State.

With much of the palace was in a state of decay and it would be logical to assume that the pavilion that was in the best state of preservation would be the first one to be put on display. This was not the case, for the Pavilion of the Holy Mantle of the Prophet Muhammad was not open to the public until 1962, a number of years after the restoration of the rest of the palace had been completed. This, I would argue, was due to the fact that the state wanted to remove the previous Islamic identity that was the cornerstone of the Ottomans and replace it with a secular, Turkish one. Further, the Pavilion of the Holy Mantle housed some of the most sacred relics of Islam and could thus be used as a rally for those who preferred an Islamic identity and would also strengthen the recently ousted Caliph and provide material support for his supports. In order to placate them, the pavilion remained closed.Thus, the Topkapi Sarayi is an excellent example of how monuments can be used politically to strengthen the chosen discourse of the holders of power at a given moment.

The two other Imperial residences of the Ottoman Royalty, however, fared differently. The Yildiz and the Dolmabahce Palaces were both of more recent construction, meaning it utilized a more modern, western style of architecture and thus, felt no pressing need to transform them into museums in order to control and own the past. The Yildiz Palace was used as a luxury casino before being converted into a guesthouse for visiting heads of state and royalty. The Dolmabahce Place, on the other hand, was transferred to the government in 1924 and was used by Ataturk as a presidential residence during the summers. This is because both palaces were outwardly western and therefore, could be more easily assimilated into the new discourse, as oppose to the Topkapi Sarayi, which emanated the architecture of an Islamic and Ottoman nature and thus, needed to be controlled and confined to the pages of history and to be molded into the discourse of the state. The end result is a museum that displayed the opulence and glamour of the old Ottoman state and with added commentaries that displayed the “otherness” of the Ottoman’s, all of which was contrast to the new state and thereby reinforcing a negative perception of the Ottomans.

Ataturk and his Republic recognized that Islam and the Ottomans was deeply tied to the Turkish national identity and therefore, Ataturk pragmatically attempted to recreate Turkish identity by delegitimizing Islamic and Ottoman monuments all the while acknowledging the deep-rooted ties that Islam and Ottomans had with Turkish identity. Thus, rather than attempting to eliminate it, Ataturk, and his state attempted to create an alternative Turkish identity that was divorced from both Islam and its recent Ottoman past and this was done through the Turkish National Thesis. The Turkish National Thesis was an attempt to rewrite history in order to show the greatness, virility, and power that the Turkic civilization (the idea of a Turkic civilization was in itself a creation of this rewriting), which was absent of both an Islamic and Ottoman tie. However, one problem that occurred within Istanbul was the presence of two dominating Ottoman Islamic monuments, the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi. Thus, the state decided to reclaim both monuments by selectively remembering certain aspects of each past in order to strengthen the states new Turkish Nationalist ideology. In terms of the Hagia Sophia, its Christian past was highlighted in order to attacking the old Ottoman past and through its transformation into a museum was subsequently secularized, which reduced its Islamic character. This allowed for the highlighting of the progressiveness and Turkish modernity through the creation of a museum and the use of archeologists to uncover its past. For the Topkapi Sarayi, its process of museumification, allowed the Turkish state to control and write a particular version of history that could then be attached to the monument. Rather than highlighting its rich cultural significant, the state chose to depict the imperial power as an opulent, irrational entity that drove itself to its demise. Thus, by using the vehicle of museums, the Turkish state was able to rewrite history in a certain way that would allow the two monuments to not only fit within the discourse that the state was propagating but strengthen it also.

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本文的侧重点涵盖了从1920年代共和国成立到1930年代的封面时期。这一时间段描绘了凯玛主义政府在其领导人穆斯塔法·凯末尔·“阿塔图尔克”(1881-1938)的沉重手腕和视野下试图巩固权力并重新组建新土耳其国时所面临的斗争。 Soner Cagaptay将1920和1930年代划分为两个截然不同的时期,每个时期都有其独特而独特的特征。对于Cagaptay而言,1920年代是土耳其从1912-13巴尔干战争,第一次世界大战和1920-22希腊-土耳其战争带来的物质和人口灾难中恢复的时代。因此,卡加帕泰将这一时期定性为“阿塔图尔克将精力集中于建立世俗共和制时的政治和政治结构调整时期”。 政治重组的最明显例子是民族主义者(安卡拉圈子)和伊斯坦布尔圈子之间的斗争,后者由奥佐格鲁定义为不支持安卡拉运动的人,特别是保皇党。这场斗争以“ 150人事件”(Yuzellilikler Olayi)突显,其中《洛桑条约》(1923年)包括了一个原因,该原因规定,与敌人合作的人必须大赦(针对新土耳其人)共和国),土耳其人有权命名150名回教徒,这些人将不受大赦。这份全面的清单很好地表明了使安卡拉圈子感到紧张的人民和派系,其中包括:非王朝成员的瓦赫丁(Vahdettin)圈子,承担反安卡拉卡里帕尔军队责任的奥斯曼内阁成员,签署了安卡拉帝国的人。塞夫尔条约,哈里发军队的成员,以太坊“切尔克斯人”及其同伙,切尔克斯人大会代表,与占领军合作的警务人员以及反对安卡拉圆环的记者。因此,这份清单有趣的是,即使凯末尔主义者意识到库尔德民族主义及其潜在威胁(1925年谢赫·赛义德叛乱所表明的),也决定将库尔德人排除在外。但是,安卡拉圈子并没有驱逐库尔德领导人,而是决定包括一个大型的切尔克斯人团体,其中许多人是无关紧要的切尔克斯人民族主义者。奥佐格鲁认为,这是因为切尔克斯人传统上接近奥斯曼帝国的统治和皇室,因此,安卡拉圈子担心他们会与外国势力结盟。因此,这个时期可以定义为政治重组时期,特别是为了铲除上一个奥斯曼王朝,因为阿塔图尔克认为“只要奥斯曼王朝居住在土耳其,反对安卡拉的人就会受到鼓励。” 1930年代初标志着重点和重点与1920年代有所不同。在1930年代,共和国更加牢固地建立了国家,本国得以重建,因此,该州能够从巩固统治和消灭上一个奥斯曼帝国王朝的支持者的先前工作重心转向意识形态和国家建设。阿塔图尔克在1931年9月24日发表的演讲中概述了国家将要关注的意识形态,他在讲话中宣布,凯末尔主义的主要原则是共和主义,民族主义,民粹主义,民族主义,世俗主义和改良主义。





土耳其国家论文是土耳其历史委员会的项目,该委员会成立于1930年4月23日,并于该年出版了《土耳其历史总纲》,该大纲由阿塔图尔克本人撰写。第二年(1931年),出版了四册高中历史教科书,在1933-1936年之间,制定了66个后续项目。土耳其国家论文的目的是(1)通过科学和理性世俗化土耳其历史以及历史世界观; (2)消除以欧洲为中心的世界历史观,从而将历史重心从东方而非西方转向; (3)揭露奥斯曼帝国过去的古迹在使用宗教方面是落后和不合理的; (4)表明土耳其历史在奥斯曼帝国和伊斯兰教崛起之前具有辉煌的历史。因此,圣索菲亚大教堂和托普卡匹萨拉伊大教堂,都是奥斯曼帝国的信标,将被取代,这是与历史国家论文相结合的。奥斯曼帝国的纪念碑是古老的奥斯曼帝国统治的象征,并且随着历史民族论文的兴起,不再需要回到奥斯曼帝国的过去,相反,国家可以首先淡化和贬损奥斯曼帝国的过去,并通过新的建筑形式,突显了突厥人过去的辉煌,从而通过新的民族主义者身份加强了新州对安纳托利亚心脏地带的主权。



适用于本文的另一种理论是爱德华·赛义德(Edward Said)的“其他”(other)概念的应用。为了显示共和国的进步,与显示奥斯曼帝国或“另一个”的非理性,软弱和野蛮行为形成对照,在土耳其现代性中,这是必要的。换句话说,“他者”是所有错误的东西,并且是通往现代性和国家的障碍。这就是让土耳其人民落后的原因。这些理论可以解释共和国决定将圣索非亚大教堂和托普卡匹萨拉伊世俗化的动机以及随后的博物馆化。


圣索菲亚大教堂,又称阿雅索菲亚大教堂,是奥斯曼帝国苏丹的中央清真寺,自1453年被占领起直至1932年改制成博物馆。圣索非亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)是奥斯曼帝国的第一个帝国清真寺,苏丹在Jumu'ah参加。需要问的问题是:世俗化和穆斯林化的纪念碑怎么可能?为什么选择圣索非亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)?背后的动机是什么?世俗化和博物馆化所使用的过程和方法是什么?

如上一节所述,到1930年代,国家的政权更加牢固,土耳其的反对派在很大程度上受到压制。此外,在1930年代,政府开始了一场运动,以构建新的土耳其民族主义话语,以取代以前的多民族,无背长椅和伊斯兰教的身份。因此,在1930年代,阿塔图尔克(Ataturk)感到他可以将圣索菲亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)从伊斯兰奥斯曼帝国的纪念碑转变为世俗博物馆,并利用它来增强自己的民族主义话语和建构。这与安卡拉也没有足够的信心以相同的优势废除苏丹国和哈里发的论点同时出现。一些学者认为,废除哈里发王朝并不一定是为了废除哈里发王朝的职位,而是为了消除王朝及其威胁。然而,阿塔图尔克当时非常谨慎,同样也很谨慎,并等待着圣索菲亚大教堂世俗化和博物馆化的动机。

将圣索非亚大教堂改为博物馆而不是其他奥斯曼帝国清真寺的决定是基于其在奥斯曼帝国之前的历史。 1453年奥斯曼帝国征服君士坦丁堡后,苏丹本人决定将东正教基督教,君士坦丁堡和拜占庭帝国统治的象征转变为清真寺,并以此为基础来加强苏丹的统治,合法性和力量。但是,对于阿塔图尔克和新州来说,这一次基督教教堂转为帝国清真寺,成为过去苏丹国的象征,并且作为主导天际线的纪念碑,这将使伊斯坦布尔的公民想起荣耀,并有可能是最近被奥斯曼帝国苏丹解体的标志。哈里发。因此,为了制止其潜在的危险,阿塔图尔克重新分配了圣索非亚大教堂,并将其改造成博物馆,从而通过世俗化和商品化,将其基督教元素以及伊斯兰教义与其他元素一起暴露出来。这与考古学家提出的理论是一致的,即改变现有物质证据(例如任何奥斯曼清真寺)的先前解释是困难的,因为它们被固定在物质中,因此参与者“可以指出物质证据来支持他或她的主张”。 。但是,国家通过暴露其基督教的过去,削弱了奥斯曼帝国在纪念碑上的身份以及奥斯曼帝国创造的“团结意识”,从而重新利用了过去。


美国拜占庭学院的创始人托马斯·惠特莫尔(Thomas Whittemore,1871-1950年)于1931年开始在圣索非亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)上发现马赛克,由于他的成功,圣索菲亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)在1935年作为博物馆开放后一直沿用至今。马赛克的发现被视为发现圣索非亚大教堂的马赛克的杰作,其西方观众将其视为可与大英博物馆的埃尔金大理石相媲美,因为该马赛克是拜占庭艺术的杰作。但是,在惠特莫尔(Whittemore)努力之前,马赛克只是通过描述中世纪作品而形成的概念,而不是现实。他的努力以及他富有的顾客的努力,只是西方对圣索菲亚大教堂的兴趣的一种体现,体现了拜占庭的创造力,艺术品和纪念碑。因此,国家决定允许惠特莫尔剥离在查士丁尼时期仅覆盖马赛克艺术品实例的石膏,随后世俗化并建立圣索非亚大教堂作为博物馆,部分原因是西方的热情和兴趣。然而,圣索非亚大教堂作为一个公共纪念碑,由于其自​​身的“占领”而受到其商业化的影响,因为它不仅服务于政治,旅游业和想象力。尼尔森(Nelson)展示出,随着越来越多的欧美游客参观圣索非亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia),其周围环境开始发生变化,使该景点看起来更像西方图片所吸引游客的那幅画。圣索非亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)从一座“活的建筑物”转变为一座“重要的和具有社会意义的”教堂和清真寺,同时又变成了一座“现代纪念碑”,这座建筑物“在过去的某个时期被冻结,模糊地称为拜占庭式”。

圣索菲亚大教堂曾经是拜占庭帝国的中心,在其创建者所设想的领域之外,被改造成一座帝国清真寺,以象征奥斯曼帝国的力量和勃勃生机,并再次改建为博物馆以服务于此新的土耳其共和国。随着新共和国的稳定和开始写新的民族主义话语以建立统一的土耳其身份的努力,圣索菲亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)是过去更宏伟的纪念碑,被用作新未来的象征(一个(基于理性和科学)是世俗的),并揭露并重写其无背长椅的过去。作为无声的纪念碑,土耳其政府得以赋予它以新的开始的象征。作为一个世俗博物馆,除了历史,宗教不再对圣索非亚大教堂产生任何影响,因为它被及时冻结了。因此,将土耳其历史论文作为对奥斯曼帝国前势力的纪念而具有延展性,而仅作为博物馆,古老的纪念碑,最终将受到外部商业化和西方压力的影响而变形和扭曲。

托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)

托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)是奥斯曼帝国苏丹在624年统治期间的大约400年(1465年至1856年)的主要住所,并在1924年从代表帝国的纪念碑合法地变为代表民族的纪念碑。直到1927年,它才向公众开放,但大部分宫殿直到1939年至1942年间进行了整修后才关闭。与圣索菲亚大教堂(Hagia Sophia)仍被用作信徒的清真寺不同,宫殿一直在废弃中,只有一座老年服务人员,幸存的太监,以及矮人作为其剩余居民。哈里发特解散后不久,该州有足够的信心将这座宫殿收回并将其改建为博物馆,这是主要原因,该州基本上被遗弃了。为宫殿准备博物馆的过程使人们对新共和国为博物馆所要达到的目标有深刻的了解,因为必须对其进行情境化和解释。

共和国的建筑师之一塞达(Sedad Hakki Eldem)(1908-88)将宫殿描述为“充满珍贵宝藏的地方,织物有时互为碎布,有时呼应其昔日的光辉”,“其中大部分我提到的地方已经被清理过,被摧毁了,并挖出了重要的切石基础和拱门。” 1937年,埃尔德姆被告知要拍照,尤其是宫殿的坍塌部分,以便在修复之前“瞥见”宫殿。在国家宣传的话语中,这种“拍前”照片的举动具有重大意义,因为它具有两个含义:(a)加强了将奥斯曼帝国定为“其他”的观念,并且(b)展示了其力量。新国家及其如何将如此重要的土耳其纪念碑恢复到以前的辉煌,并挽救了它在“衰落时期”的地位。这两点都强化了新的土耳其民族主义身份的观念,以及如何使新的土耳其民族主义身份得到认可。新国家再次为土耳其人民带来了荣耀和力量。

托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)也成为选择性纪念的受害者。如上所述,消除过去的过去以及将其与政治联系起来是构建有用的过去的一部分。对于Topkapi Sarayi,仅使用某些元素以通过冻结时间来显示特定的过去,从而创建相对不合时宜和静态的宫殿景观。平铺的亭子是接受这种处理的一部分。它是在穆罕默德二世(Mehmed II)统治期间建造的,采用了国际帖木儿(Timurud)风格,融合了受中亚影响的砖块,波斯立面和瓷砖以及复兴主义的哥特式元素。这种风格的使用是为了传达穆罕默德二世世界帝国的普遍主义品质。但是,该博物馆将建筑物用作一个单独的陶瓷博物馆,从而完全省去了这段叙事和视觉历史。此外,许多后来的大多数最简陋的房间都被关闭了,国库馆没有恢复到以前的样子,而是墙壁被粉刷了,在宫殿的某些地方,装饰被简单地剥离了,例如案例厨房的这些决定背后的含义没有记载,但共同努力将托普卡帕萨拉伊塑造成一座纪念碑,曾经是贵族富裕的场所,但牺牲了平民百姓(由于厨房的朴素),并且隐藏了被利用的普遍主义图案由穆罕默德二世(Mehmed II)提出,与国家的民族主义土耳其言论背道而​​驰。

由于宫殿的大部分处于腐烂状态,因此可以合理地假设处于保存状态最好的亭子将是第一个展示的亭子。情况并非如此,因为先知穆罕默德的圣地斗篷亭直到1962年才对外开放。我想说,这是由于该国希望删除以前的奥斯曼帝国基石的伊斯兰身份,并用世俗的土耳其身份代替。此外,圣斗篷的亭子里藏有一些伊斯兰教最神圣的文物,因此可以作为那些偏爱伊斯兰身份的人的集会,也将加强最近被赶下的哈里发,为他的支持提供物质支持。为了安抚他们,亭子一直关闭。因此,托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)是一个很好的例子,说明了如何在特定时刻通过政治手段使用纪念碑来增强权力持有者的选择话语权。

但是,奥斯曼皇室的其他两个帝国住所的情况却有所不同。伊尔迪兹(Yildiz)宫殿和多尔玛巴赫切(Dolmabahce)宫殿都是较新的建筑,这意味着它采用了更现代的西方建筑风格,因此,迫切需要将它们改造成博物馆,以控制和拥有过去。伊尔迪兹宫(Yildiz Palace)被用作豪华赌场,之后被改建为招待国家元首和皇室成员的旅馆。另一方面,多尔玛巴赫切广场(Dolmabahce Place)于1924年移交给政府,夏季被阿塔图尔克(Ataturk)用作总统府邸。这是因为两个宫殿都朝外,因此可以像托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)反对的那样,更容易地融入新的论述中,托普卡帕·萨拉伊(Topkapi Sarayi)散发出伊斯兰和奥斯曼帝国的建筑,因此需要加以控制和限制历史并被塑造成国家话语。最终的结果是一座博物馆,展示了旧奥斯曼帝国的富裕和魅力,并添加了一些评论,展示了奥斯曼帝国的“其他”,所有这些都与新奥斯曼帝国形成鲜明对比,从而增强了对奥斯曼帝国的负面印象。

阿塔图尔克及其共和国认识到伊斯兰教和奥斯曼帝国与土耳其民族认同紧密相连,因此,阿塔图尔克务实地尝试通过使伊斯兰和奥斯曼古迹合法化来重塑土耳其的认同,同时承认伊斯兰教和奥斯曼帝国与土耳其之间的根深蒂固的联系。身份。因此,阿塔图尔克与其尝试消除土耳其的身份,而不是试图消除它,而是试图与土耳其及其最近的奥斯曼帝国时代脱节的土耳其替代身份,这是通过土耳其民族论文完成的。土耳其国家论文试图重写历史,以显示土耳其文明(土耳其文明的思想本身就是这种重写的产物)的伟大,勃勃生机和力量,而伊斯兰教和伊斯兰教都没有奥斯曼领带。但是,伊斯坦布尔发生的一个问题是存在两个主要的奥斯曼伊斯兰纪念碑,即圣索菲亚大教堂和托普卡匹萨拉伊。因此,该州决定通过选择性地记住每个过去的某些方面来收回这两个古迹,以加强该州的新土耳其民族主义意识形态。就圣索非亚大教堂而言,其基督教的历史被突出显示是为了攻击旧的奥斯曼帝国的历史,并通过改建为博物馆而世俗化,从而降低了其伊斯兰特色。通过建立博物馆和利用考古学家揭示其过去,这突出了进步性和土耳其现代性。对于Topkapi Sarayi的博物馆化过程,它允许土耳其政府控制和书写特定的历史版本,然后将其附加到纪念碑上。国家没有强调其丰富的文化意义,而是选择将帝国权力描绘成一个富裕的,非理性的实体,使自己走向灭亡。因此,通过使用博物馆的工具,土耳其国家能够以某种方式重写历史,这将使这两个纪念碑不仅适合该国正在传播的话语,而且也可以对其进行加强。


@natasha #122956 就是没发布,而且也发布无望,很显然土耳其议题没人感兴趣,所以才能发上来

@邓矮子 #122957


不过我发表一点愚见,如有冒犯请见谅:由于史学界眼下正夯的material turn, 考古学的文章发表似乎比较重视新的考古发现。当然如果有重大理论突破,也是可以依据他人的发现重新整合资料发表....

( 由 作者 于 2021年1月22日 编辑 )
食人大佐韦国清 有缘再见


邹韬奋 (男)消极自由需要积极的个人主义来维护

@食人大佐韦国清 #123010 不解构土耳其泛突,难道真的从黑海打到新疆去搞大突厥?不一样是鸡飞狗跳么?而且现在艾大大厄苏丹是两头不靠,泛突也半边,泛伊也半边。

again, @thphd , 英文换行断词的问题如何解决?

@食人大佐韦国清 #123010


@natasha #123031 权力产生知识,但是没有权力就不能产生知识了吗?美国的另类叙事,都是在没有权力的人中产生的。精英的靶子好找,群众的靶子要怎么找呢?阿塔图尔克这个靶子好找,宗教狂热的靶子要怎么找呢?要归咎于埃尔多安这样的人吗?他能负什么责任呢,他不过是紧紧抓着权力的木板,顺着水流而已。

@食人大佐韦国清 #123041




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